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Abstract 
This article analyses the presence of large-scale transnational communication groups in the Spanish 
television industry through an analysis of several television markets: free-to-air television (both 
nationwide and autonomous regional channels), independent production, pay television and the 
production of thematic channels. In order to do this, we detail the quantitative presence of the 
leading players in the field and, complementing this with an approach from the social network 
analysis, we outline the commercial relationships between them. To this quantitative dimension, we 
add an exploration of the strategies employed by these groups in accessing the market, examining 
the typology of their presence and the relative positions of strength of each one of the groups 
detected. Amongst our conclusions, we stress the growing internationalisation of the television 
industry in Spain and we note the differences observed within different groups in relation to their 
country of origin. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As an integral part of the cultural industries, television has evolved considerably in the last two decades. 
During this period, there has been a dismantling of public service broadcasting monopolies and, thanks to 
new regulations and technical advances, broadcasting markets have been opened up with the 
incorporation of new players. The value chain has also been lengthened with the appearance of 
intermediaries and with progressive outsourcing of television production. The number of companies 
present in the sector has grown significantly, including some broadcasters who started off as creators and 
distributors of on demand television programmes using new platforms. 
In Spain, large-scale worldwide communication groups have played a leading role in this process, in a 
dialectical relationship with their Spanish counterparts (with groups with whom they have occasionally 
been in competition, but also with those with whom they have allied or cooperated depending on the 
circumstances in each market and the penetration and consolidation strategies developed). 
In this context, this article analyses several Spanish television markets with three basic objectives: firstly, 
to calculate the share of the transnational media corporations (TNMC) in the Spanish TV industry. 
                                                           
1  A previous version of this work was presented at the II Congreso Nacional ULEPICC-España (Barcelona, 28th November 2008). The author appreciates the 
comments and debates sparked off by those attending that conference. They have enriched the final version of this article. 
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Secondly, to establish a typology for these entities based on variables such as their country of origin or 
their activities. Finally, to reveal the models followed by these groups in accessing the Spanish market. 
In order to do this, we have based our research on the preliminary question: what is the quantitative 
presence of foreign communications group in the Spanish television sector? In addition, we asked 
ourselves a second qualitative question: what kind of strategies have these groups developed in accessing 
the Spanish market? 
In order to achieve these objectives and answer the research questions we had posed, our analysis 
started with a cultural industries approach and the idea that “video as a product is actually several 
interrelated products operating in several interrelated markets” (Bates, 1998, p. 84). Consequently, this 
research explored several television markets: free-to-air (FTA) TV broadcasting (both nationwide and 
regional channels), independent production for FTA channels, pay television (satellite, cable and IPTV) as 
well as the production of thematic channels for pay-TV. 
Given the macroeconomic goal analysed, as in most research carried out of this type, sources included 
secondary documents (data gathered from several sources). The first source was the annual report 
published by the GECA (Gabinete de Estudios de la Comunicación Audiovisual – Audiovisual 
Communication Studies Board), from which we obtained data about the volume of annual production by 
television companies, the volume of independent production and the flow of content from producers to 
broadcasters. Another source was the monthly magazines that the pay-TV platforms publish in which data 
related to what their channels are offering were amassed. Descriptive data about the different companies, 
as well as information about their shareholdings, were obtained from the Registro Mercantil – Mercantile 
Register (accessed via the electronic service SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos – Balance 
Analysis System for Iberia). Finally, other sources (such as the general or specialised press) allowed us, in 
some cases, to complete information relative to the different markets or their protagonists. 
Some of the data obtained through these sources used different temporal markers (the calendar year or 
the television season) which made a comparison between markets more difficult. In any case, our 
research centred on the year 2006 and the television season 2005/06, the last year for which full data 
were available. Whenever possible, reference was made to the historical development of the presence of 
TNMC’s. 
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2. Methodology 
 
Once the main protagonists in each market had been identified we employed a double analysis method. 
Firstly, a descriptive exploration of these players was carried out, applying an ad hoc analysis register. This 
was done in order to identify particular variables from the outset that were considered relevant, such as 
the group’s activities, their degree of independence with respect to any larger, or controlling groups, their 
shareholders and their origin. Secondly, a relational analysis of these protagonists was carried out. Using 
SNA (social network analysis) methodology, the commercial relationships between groups in previously 
defined markets was traced in the way established for the cultural industries area (Fernández Quijada, 
2008). In order to do this, we used the software UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002), which 
allowed us to tabulate data in matrixes. Later, this allowed us to represent graphically the relationship 
between players using sociograms drawn up using another computer tool – NetDraw. 
The application of this methodology on two levels allowed us to characterise the leading players in the 
market and establish the network of relationships between them. The basic idea is that the structure of a 
sector is not defined solely by the characteristics of its protagonists, but rather by the network of 
relationships between them. 
 
 
3. The internationalisation of the television market 
 
The internationalisation of cultural industries, in particular the television industry, is a subject that has 
been dealt with by several authors over the years, since the landmark contribution by Schiller (1992, 
originally 1969) on cultural imperialism. This idea, which is also related to the analysis of the international 
television programme trade carried out by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis (1974), served as a source 
of inspiration that sparked the world debate on unbalanced information flows (MacBride, 1987, originally 
1980), the well-known New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). In recent years, 
scholars have tried to explain this persistent inequality using different theories such as geolinguistic 
regions (Sinclair, 2000) or geocultural markets (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). 
In any case, it is necessary to remember three aspects that are often overlooked when speaking about 
this phenomenon. Firstly, globalisation is not a phenomenon unique to the communications sphere, but 
rather affects, generically (to a greater or lesser degree) all industrial-economic processes; although the 
high symbolic value of cultural industries products give them an exceptional representational status in this 
process. In this sense, we can say that “global media are a necessary component of global capitalism and 
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one of its defining features” (Hermann & McChesney, 1997, p. 10). Secondly, when speaking about the 
globalisation of communications we need to remember that we are not dealing with a new phenomenon, 
but rather one that has been found in the different sections of our cultural industries since their 
beginnings, as can be proven by glancing through their history; although there has been an undoubted 
acceleration in the last few years. Marx himself spoke of the natural tendency of capitalism towards 
internationalising its activities, so it is only natural that the industrialisation of culture should be linked to 
the phenomenon of internationalisation. In the end, it is important to contextualize the globalisation 
process within the framework of the development of an advanced phase of capitalism and its tendency to 
accumulate and reproduce capital; although it is also true that in other political systems attempted during 
the 20th century, such as socialism, these tendencies were also marked. 
Given these precedents, the internationalisation of television and its participation in the globalizing process 
is undeniable. The reasons why cultural industries, television among them, have become active 
participants in the globalisation process are varied (Richeri, 1994). They include: gaining a competitive 
advantage by reaching a size that will reinforce the group with respect to its competitors; finding new 
opportunities for growth outside the saturated market of the country of origin; making best use of the 
group’s experience in new markets; taking advantage of a situation that favours the purchasing power of 
one share with respect to another; obtaining economies of scale that would be impossible in the original 
national market and, finally, getting around national antitrust laws. 
The rapid and growing internationalisation of the leading players in television systems has occasioned a 
dichotomy between their transnational character and the national nature of communication systems. 
Faced with this perspective, “the dominant players treat the media markets as a single global market with 
local subdivisions” (Hermann & McChesney, 1997, p. 41). One of these markets, the Spanish market, is 
the one we will analyse from here on. 
 
 
4. The television market in Spain 
 
4.1. FTA Television 
 
From the beginnings of private television in Spain2 the presence of international companies and capital can 
be detected: the French channel Canal Plus France and the Italian Fininvest participated in Canal Plus 
                                                           
2  Private television in Spain was approved in 1988 through Ley 10/1988, de 3 de mayo, de Televisión Privada – Law 10/1988, of 3rd May, covering Private 
Television (Boletín Oficial del Estado, #108, 5th May 1988). Concessions to the new operators were granted in August 1989. 
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(Spain) and Telecinco with a limit of a 25% share imposed by law.3 For its part, Antena 3 saw the 
participation of a group of five international financial entities (Rothschild, Dillon Road Ltd., Scottish 
Equitable Stain, Rabobank and Fidelity International) who, together, initially owned some 20% of the 
group’s shares. Seventeen years later, and after the appearance in the market of new operators, the 
average level of involvement by international protagonists in the capital behind nationwide private 
television concessions has increased in importance and management power. 
According to data available in the Mercantile Register for December 2006, the makeup of shares in the 
different concessionary companies indirectly managing public service television, both analogue and digital, 
was very variable (see Table 1).4 
 
 
Table 1. Shareholders in private FTA TV companies (12/2006) 
FTA Operator Channels
5
 Shareholders % 
Gestevisión Telecinco S.A. 
Telecinco 
T5 Sport 
T5 Estrellas 
Mediaset Investimenti SpA 50.10 
Corporación de Nuevos Medios Audiovisuales S.L. 13.00 
State Street Bank and Trust Company 5.07 
Chase Nominees Ltd. 5.02 
The Capital Group Companies Inc. 1.16 
Fidelity International Ltd. 1.02 
Stock market 24.63 
Antena 3 de Televisión S.A.
6
 
Antena 3 
Antena Neox 
Antena Nova 
Grupo Planeta De Agostini S.L. 39.48 
RTL Group S.A. 19.00 
Grupo Santander 10.01 
Grupo Rayet S.A. 5.55 
State Street Bank and Trust Company 5.17 
Self owned 5.00 
Fidelity International Ltd. 2.00 
Stock market 13.79 
                                                           
3  Among the projects which were not granted concessions was that of News International (belonging to the Australian magnate Rupert Murdoch), which 
controlled 25% of the capital of Univisión Canal 1. 
4  According to Spanish laws, public service broadcasting is directly provided by public companies such as the former monopoly Televisión Española (TVE) and 
regional broadcasters (Euskal Telebista [ETB], Televisió de Catalunya [TVC], Televisión de Galicia [TVG], Canal Sur, Telemadrid, Ràdio Televisió Valenciana 
[RTVV], Televisión Canaria [TV Can] and Castilla-La Mancha Televisión [CMT] and those created after the date of our analysis) as well as indirectly by private 
companies like those analyzed in this chapter. 
5  Since the season under analysis, channels on offer have varied in relation to the increasing penetration of Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT). So, T5 Sport 
and T5 Estrellas have been substituted by Telecinco 2 and FDF, Intereconomía TV has ceded its frequency to SETenVEO (a channel produced by Sony, 
available since the end of the 2005/06 season), Net TV and Fly Music have become Intereconomía TV and Disney Channel and Telehit has been replaced by 
Hogar 10. 
6  The data available in SABI does not correspond exactly with that declared by the company itself in its 2006 annual report, in which the Planeta De Agostini 
Group figured with 42.63% of the capital, the building firm Grupo Rayet with 5.86%, self owned shares representing 2.50% and Grupo Santander no longer 
forming part of the shareholders. The percentage of shares in the stock market would suppose, according to this source, 30.46% of the total, including 
shares that are in the hands of the State Street Bank and Trust Company and Fidelity International Ltd. (Antena 3 de Televisión, 2007). 
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Sogecable S.A. 
Cuatro 
CNN+ 
40 Latino 
Promotora de Informaciones S.A. 42.94 
Grupo Telefónica 15.63 
Vivendi 5.50 
EC Nominees Limited 5.46 
Eventos S.A. 3.05 
Corporación Financiera Caja de Madrid S.A. 3.03 
Financière Syz & Co. 2.18 
Corporación General Financiera S.A. 2.10 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1.98 
Stock market 18.13 
Veo Televisión S.A. 
Veo TV 
Intereconomía TV 
Unidad Editorial S.A. 53.50 
Iberdrola S.A. 20.00 
Others 26.50 
Sociedad Gestora de Televisión Net 
TV S.A. 
Net TV 
Fly Music 
Vocento S.A. 70.07 
Dinamia Capital Privado Sociedad de Capital Riesgo S.A. 2.29 
Others 27.64 
Gestora de Inversiones 
Audiovisuales La Sexta S.A. 
laSexta 
Telehit 
GAMP Audiovisual S.A. 51.00 
Grupo Televisa S.A.B. de C.V. 40.00 
Gala Desarrollos Comerciales S.L. 9.00 
 
Source: author’s own research based on SABI data. 
 
In the case of Gestevisión Telecinco S.A., (the company that won the concession for the frequency on 
which the station that attract the largest audience Telecinco and the digital channels T5 Sport and T5 
Estrellas broadcast) there is the Italian group Mediaset which were one of the original shareholders 
through Fininvest. It maintains in its power a little more than half of the shares and in consequence, 
exercises control over the company and the branches of the corporation. The Spanish partner in the 
project was the Vocento group (through the Corporación de Nuevos Medios Audiovisuales). Its 
contribution was most notable in controlling the editorial line of news programmes, although its 
commitment to Telecinco was in some doubt due to its investments in a competing operator, Net TV. The 
rest of the capital was made up of capitalist investors, although what really circulated on the stock 
exchange was only approximately a quarter of the total, because international funds (such as State Street 
Bank and Trust Company, Chase Nominees Ltd. or The Capital Group Companies, Inc.) maintained 
permanent positions, acting as institutional investors. 
Antena 3 de Televisión S.A., the entity responsible for Antena 3 and the DTT channels Antena Neox and 
Antena Nova, has been the company with the greatest instability amongst its stockholders from its 
beginnings. Throughout its history, different groups have controlled the company, including Banco Español 
de Crédito (Banesto), Renvir (a company controlled by Grupo Zeta, the Spanish multimedia holding), the 
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telecommunications giant Telefónica or, currently, the joint-venture (at 50%) between the Spanish group 
Planeta and the Italian De Agostini, which assumed command of the firm thanks to their control of 
39.48% of the shares. Another well-known shareholder was the Luxembourg-based group RTL (89.80% of 
which is controlled by the German giant Bertelsmann). In practice, despite holding 19% of the shares in 
the company, RTL had no effective decision making power in the group due to the control exercised by 
Planeta and De Agostini. 
Sogecable S.A., the company behind Cuatro, and the digital stations CNN+ and 40 Latino (which was 
previously involved in the pay-TV channel Canal+) still had two of its original shareholders, Promotora de 
Informaciones S.A. (PRISA) and the French group Vivendi (which includes Canal+ France), although the 
positions of strength had changed: Canal+ France originally introduced its pay-TV model, whilst PRISA 
brought with it knowledge of the local market and its contacts in the political sphere. At the moment 
under study in the present analysis, the pay-tv model of Canal+ had changed to the FTA used by Cuatro, 
while effective control of the company had fallen to PRISA, a fact that would be confirmed months later 
with the launch of a successful takeover bid for the entire capital. Vivendi, in contrast, only maintained 
4.68% after the restructuring of the French parent company and its widespread divesting of assets in the 
international arena. Telefónica, with 15.63%, also figured amongst the list of shareholders. Other 
shareholders including the BBVA bank - through the Corporación General Financiera - or the investment 
group Eventos had once formed the founding nucleus. They had a minority shareholding that was 
completed with recourse to the stock exchange where the rest of the capital was quoted. 
In Veo Televisión S.A. –Veo TV and Intereconomía TV, only available on DTT– the bulk of the shares was 
in the hands of Unidad Editorial S.A., the Spanish subsidiary of the Italian group RCS Media (Rizzoli 
Corriere della Sera) which held 53.50%. The other identifiable shareholder was the Spanish energy 
company Iberdrola (20%). 
In Sociedad Gestora de Televisión Net TV S.A. –Net TV and Flymusic, only available on DTT– the majority 
shareholder was the Spanish Vocento group. There was no complete list of shareholders in the Register, in 
which, in addition to Vocento the only other company listed was the venture capital firm Dinamia.7 
Finally, Gestora de Inversiones Audiovisuales La Sexta S.A. –laSexta and the DTT channel Telehit– was 
controlled by the GAMP Audiovisual Group which held 51% of its capital. This company also controlled the 
Imagina Group, which was created from the merger of the Mediapro and Árbol groups, and in which also 
participated the production companies Bainet and El Terrat de Produccions, as well as the savings bank 
Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa (BBK). The rest of the capital was shared between the Mexican Televisa group (40%) 
                                                           
7  The US group Disney currently controls 20% of the company’s capital and, thanks to an agreement with the rest of the shareholders, broadcasts its Disney 
Channel as a FTA offer on DTT. 
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and the venture capital fund Gala Capital through the company Gala Desarrollos Comerciales S.L., the last 
company to join the project. 
By the end of 2006, it was clear that companies of foreign origin played a central role in private FTA 
broadcasters. In some of them, they even exercised control, such as Telecinco or Veo Televisión, while in 
others they held joint control such as the case of De Agostini and Antena 3, managed jointly with the 
Spanish Planeta group. Additionally, shareholdings in Antena 3 were largely in the hands of foreign 
companies, since in addition to the role of De Agostini we must add that of RTL and the different 
investment funds present as institutional investors. The position of the Mexican Televisa group in laSexta 
(40%) was also important, even though their share did not allow them to contribute to the management 
of the firm. On average, in the six companies running this service, capital in the hands of Spanish 
shareholders represented 44.88% of the total, against 36.55% in the hands of stockholders based outside 
Spain and some 18.57% whose origin was unknown (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Origin of shareholders in private FTA TV companies (12/2006) 
Source: author’s own research. 
 
If we deepen our analysis into the origin of these foreign shareholders (Figure 2), the dominant position of 
Italian companies is clearly reflected. They represented 56.71% of the total shares controlled by foreign 
groups, the result of the positions held by Mediaset, De Agostini and the RCS MediaGroup. The role of 
Televisa in laSexta made Mexico the second largest foreign investor in FTA broadcast television (18.24%), 
followed by Germany (9.12%, a fruit of the investment of Bertelsmann in Antena 3), The United States 
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(6.22%, through State Street Bank and Trust Company and The Capital Group Companies Inc. in 
Telecinco, State Street Bank and Trust Company in Antena 3 and Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. in 
Sogecable), the United Kingdom (4.78%, through Chase Nominees Ltd. in Telecinco and EC Nominees 
Limited in Sogecable), France (2.51%, through Vivendi in Sogecable), the Bermuda (1.43% through the 
role played by Fidelity International in Telecinco and Antena 3) and Switzerland (0.99%, through 
Financière Syz & Co.). 
 
 
Figure 2. Origin of international shareholders in private FTA TV companies (12/2006) 
Source: author’s own research. 
 
 
4.2. Independent production for FTA TV 
 
In accordance with data from GECA (2007), the majority of companies present in the Spanish independent 
production market during the 2005/06 season were family firms or SMEs (small and medium enterprises) 
that had managed to carve themselves a niche in the world of television. A growing number of others 
were integrated in national or transnational media groups that often competed in the market through a 
number of affiliates, or even held related shareholdings in television channels. In the latter case, their 
independent status became a mere formality since in reality they were subcontracting within the same 
group. In any case, in the present text we include under the independent label all producers who are 
autonomous, even those belonging to companies that participate as major shareholders. All of these 
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produced a total of 19,455.42 hours of programming for the different nationwide, or regional, operators. 
The different independent Spanish producers included belonging to foreign groups made up some 4.31% 
of the total production, with 838.07 hours (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Foreign producers by market share (2005/06) 
TNMC 
Spanish 
subsidiary 
Production company 
TV Hours 
produced 
% 
Producers who are subsidiaries of foreign groups 
Walt Disney Walt Disney Iberia The Walt Disney Company Iberia S.L. 218.65 1.12 
Magnolia TV Magnolia TV Spain Magnolia TV Spain 167.60 0.86 
RCS MediaGroup Unidad Editorial Canal Mundo Producciones Audiovisuales S.A. 144.68 0.74 
Mediaset Telecinco Salta Producciones 109.17 0.56 
4K Holding Cuatro Cabezas Cuatro Cabezas Films S.L. 101.35 0.52 
Bertelsmann 
FremtantleMedia 
Spain Grundy Producciones S.A. 87.75 0.45 
Sony Sony España Sony Pictures Television Producciones España S.L. 8.87 0.05 
TOTAL   838.07 4.31 
     
Producers nominally in the hands of foreign companies 
- Martingala Televisión Sisifus Producciones S.L. 131.62 131.62 
Imagina Imagina 
Globo Media S.A. 1,171.75 1,171.75 
Mediaproducción S.L. 843.27 843.27 
Media Report Producciones 
Audiovisuales S.L. 
584.47 584.47 
Media 3.14 88.03 88.03 
Trivideo Tricicle Ovideo S.L. 5.37 5.37 
  TOTAL 2,692.89 2,692.89 
TOTAL   2,824.51 14.52 
     
Producers integrated into foreign groups after 2006 
Endemol Endemol España 
Gestmusic Endemol S.A. 869.08 4.47 
Zeppelin Televisión S.A. 294.02 1.51 
Diagonal Televisió S.A. 276.15 1.42 
Linze Televisión S.A. 106.75 0.55 
  TOTAL 1,546.00 7.95 
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Banijay 
Entertainment 
Cuarzo Cuarzo Producciones S.L. 950.20 4.88 
TOTAL   2,496.20 12.83 
 
Source: author’s own research based on GECA and SABI data. 
 
Walt Disney, through its subsidiary The Walt Disney Company Iberia, produced two children’s shows 
based on the rights portfolio of the US parent company. Together they made up 218.65 hours, some 
1.12% of the total. 
Magnolia TV, an Italian independent production group with subsidiaries in different countries also had a 
role in the Spanish market.8 Its Spanish subsidiary, Magnolia TV España S.L., produced 167.60 hours of 
programming in 2005/06, some 0.86% of the total produced by independent companies. 
The Italian RCS MediaGroup was present in the independent production field through Canal Mundo 
Producciones Audiovisuales S.A. –which uses El Mundo TV as a commercial brand–, a producer belonging 
to its Spanish subsidiary Unidad Editorial, which, in 2005/06 totalled 144.68 hours of production, some 
0.74% of the total. 
Mediaset controlled Salta Producciones –through their subsidiary Gestevisión Telecinco–, which in 2005/06 
produced 109.17 hours, some 0.56% of the total. It also controlled small percentages of other producers 
that have not been included within the percentage attributed to Mediaset. 
The Argentinean company 4K Holding controlled 100% of the capital of Cuatro Cabezas Films.9 The 
company produced 101.35 hours, some 0.52% of the total. 
The German Bertelsmann group made its presence felt through Grundy Producciones, the company wholly 
belonging to FremantleMedia, a powerful European production group that is a subsidiary of the 
Luxembourg based RTL Group, under the control of the German multinational, also behind some of the 
capital of Antena 3 TV. In 2005/06 it produced 87.75 hours of independent production, some 0.45% of 
the total. 
The Japanese conglomerate Sony also had a token presence in the market through its Spanish subsidiary 
Sony Pictures Television Producciones España S.L., which produced 8.87 hours, some 0.05% of the total. 
The rest of the independent producers having any activity in the channels analysed over the 2005/2006 
season were in the hands of Spanish companies, although some of these shared the minority presence of 
different foreign groups: the Portuguese financial group Espirito Santo in BRB International or the similarly 
                                                           
8  At the beginning of 2007, the Italian parent company came under control of De Agostini: “Italy's De Agostini acquires controlling stake in Magnolia TV firm”, 
Forbes.com, 10th January 2007 [http://www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2007/01/10/afx3316492.html] (consulted on 30th December 2008). 
9  In August 2007, the production companies of the 4K Holding Group were bought out by the Dutch company Eyeworks 
[http://www.eyeworks.tv/en/p46c368fc120a8] (consulted 30th October 2008). 
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Portuguese communications holding Cofina in the subsidiaries of the Vértice 360º group (Notro Films and 
Telespan 2000) through its participation in the majority shareholder Avánzit. 
Doubts about the final control of other companies also arose. One example being Martingala Televisión –
the commercial brand of Sisifus Producciones S.L.–, which had a market share of some 0.68% in 2005/06. 
The company was controlled by the Dutch company M.E. Multi Educational Enterprises B.V., whose owners 
were unknown. It is therefore impossible to know whether we are dealing with a foreign controlled 
shareholder or a financial operation seeking better fiscal conditions, such as that which can be deduced 
from the structure of another supposedly Spanish company, Mediapro. In December 2006, 25% of this 
latter company was controlled by the Dutch company Equille Investment B.V. and 75% by another Dutch 
company Mediaproduction Properties B.V., which in turn were controlled by the Spanish holding Imagina 
Media Audiovisual S.L.; a company created by the fusion of the Árbol and Mediapro groups in which the 
British multinational WPP Group Plc. and the Spanish Torreal S.A. held a 20% stake (from April 2007, 
when they formalised their union with the company).10 The rest of the capital was not broken down in the 
Mercantile Register, although, through information from the press, we can assume it was in the hands of 
the company’s executives. 
Since the season that is the object of our analysis, substantial changes have taken place. Firstly, since May 
2007, the Dutch conglomerate Endemol have ceased to belong to the Spanish Telefónica group and have 
become part of a consortium formed by the Italian Mediaset and its Spanish subsidiary Telecinco, along 
with the Goldman Sachs bank and the Cyrte company.11 In Spain Endemol had four production companies 
–Gestmusic Endemol, Zeppelin Televisión, Diagonal Televisió and Linze Televisión– which, in the 2005/06 
season, made a total of 1,546 hours of original programming, some 7.95% of the Spanish total. 
Furthermore, from January 2009 Cuarzo Producciones has come under the control of the French group 
Banijay Entertainment, managed by the ex-director of Endemol France Stéphane Courbit, the French 
group Arnault, the Italian De Agostini and the Italian family concern Agnelli.12 In 2005/06 this company 
produced 950.20 hours, some 4.88% of the Spanish total. 
If we establish the binary commercial relationships existing between independent producers and FTA 
television channels13 using SNA methodology, a complex web of relationships emerges (Figure 3) in which 
                                                           
10 “Torreal buys 20% stake in Imagina”, Variety, 20th April 2007 [http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117963524.html?categoryid=2523&cs=1] (consulted 3rd 
November 2008). 
11 “Telefónica vende Endemol al consorcio de Mediaset por 2.629 millones”, El País, 14th May 2007 
[http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Telefonica/vende/Endemol/consorcio/Mediaset/2629/millones/elpepueco/20070514elpepueco_5/Tes] (consulted 
14th May 2007). 
12 “La francesa Banijay compra el 51% de Cuarzo Producciones”, Cinco Días, 13th January 2009 [http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/empresas/francesa-Banijay-
compra-51-Cuarzo-Producciones/20090113cdscdiemp_19/cdsemp/] (consulted 24th April 2009). 
13 At that date, GECA data on independent production did not include the new DTT channels, although in the majority of cases we are talking about material 
bought in international markets. In addition, there was still little external production then. 
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the basic Spanish nature of the sector (in yellow) is demonstrated. However, the position maintained by 
some producers controlled by foreign capital can also be observed, whether at the moment studied by this 
analysis (in red) or after 2006 (in purple). From this data, it can be affirmed that although quantitatively 
limited, the international presence in the independent production area was seeking central positions and, 
consequently, seeking a protagonist role.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Commercial relationships between independent producers and FTA TV stations (2005/06) 
Source: author’s own research. 
 
 
4.3. Pay television 
 
The multi-channel pay television market is highly concentrated, as demonstrated by the monopolies 
offering this service by satellite in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy or Spain. This tendency to 
concentrate in monopolies is due, in large measure, to the control of key contents that these monopolies 
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exercise to attract the public in markets which have demonstrated, at least in the European case, a growth 
ceiling when faced with the imminent arrival of a free multi-channel offer through DTT. 
The natural historical trend in the Spanish multi-channel television market has been towards 
concentration. At late 2006, it appeared that the phenomenon was reaching one of the final phases of the 
process after the culmination represented by the fusion between the cable operators Ono and Auna, which 
created the first nationwide operator. Along with these, there were still some active regional companies 
like Telecable (Asturias), R Cable (Galicia) and Euskaltel (the Basque Country), as well as the only satellite 
operator Sogecable, through Digital+. The IPTV offer had begun to gain followers and already represented 
more than 10% of pay-TV subscribers, with Telefónica playing an almost exclusive role. It had become the 
third largest operator in the Spanish pay-TV market. 
In 2006, pay television in Spain brought in €1,906.43 million (CMT, 2007), some 29.39% of all income 
generated by the television sector. This amount was concentrated, basically, in the hands of the satellite 
operator Digital+, controlled by Sogecable, who cornered 77.30% of the income; well in front of cable and 
IPTV, despite the fact that its percentage of subscribers was more than 20 points lower (54.32%) (Table 
3). 
 
Table 3. Market share for pay-TV (2006) 
Pay-TV Operator Brand Platform 
Revenues 
(thousand €) 
% Subscribers % 
Sogecable Digital+ Satellite 1,473.66 77.30 2,044,000 54.32 
Grupo Corporativo Ono Ono Cable 255.07 13.38 949,152 25.23 
Telefónica de España Imagenio IPTV 79.40 4.16 380,634 10.12 
Telecable de Asturias Telecable Cable 22.72 1.19 115,558 3.07 
R Cable y Telecomunicaciones R Cable Cable 18.70 0.98 60,988 1.62 
Euskaltel Euskaltel Cable 13.02 0.68 38,851 1.03 
Others   43.88 2.30 173,536 4.61 
TOTAL   1,906.43 100.00 3,762,719 100.00 
 
Source: CMT (2007). 
 
The analysis carried out in this research was based on the six leading companies in the market, which 
represented 97.70% of the total income and 95.39% of subscribers. The makeup of the shareholders of 
these six main protagonists is truly revealing (Table 4). 
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Table 4. Shareholders in multi-channel TV operators (2006) 
Pay-TV Operator Shareholders % 
Sogecable 
Promotora de Informaciones S.A. 42.94 
Grupo Telefónica 15.63 
Vivendi 5.50 
EC Nominees Limited 5.46 
Eventos S.A. 3.05 
Corporación Financiera Caja de Madrid S.A. 3.03 
Financière Syz & Co. 2.18 
Corporación General Financiera S.A. 2.10 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1.98 
Stock market 18.13 
Grupo Corporativo Ono S.A.14 
Grupo Multitel 21.00 
CCMP Capital LLC 15.20 
Providence Equity Partners Inc. 15.20 
Thomas H. Lee Partners L.P. 15.20 
Quadrangle Capital Partners 9.10 
GE Structured Finance Inc. 8.90 
Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec 6.70 
Grupo Santander 4.50 
Sodinteleco S.L. 4.30 
Telecable de Asturias S.A. Sociedad Promotora de las Telecomunicaciones en Asturias S.A. 100.00 
R Cable y Telecomunicaciones 
Galicia S.A. 
Unión Fenosa Inversiones S.A. 35.93 
Caixa de Aforros de Vigo, Ourense e Pontevedra 31.39 
Inversiones Gallegas del Cable S.A. 10.56 
Banco Pastor 10.04 
Cable Total S.A. 9.85 
Faro de Vigo S.A. 2.10 
Others 0.13 
R Cable y Telecomunicaciones 
Coruña S.A. 
R Cable y Telecomunicaciones Galicia S.A. 91.00 
Empresa Municipal de Aguas de La Coruña S.A. 9.00 
Euskaltel S.A. 
Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa 33.13 
CK Corporación Kutxa-Kutxa Korporazioa S.L. 22.98 
Iberdrola S.A. 11.14 
Endesa Participadas S.A. 10.00 
Self owned 5.29 
                                                           
14 The data referring to Ono was obtained from the company’s Annual Report (Ono, 2007) given the inconsistency of data available in the Mercantile Register. 
However, the sum total is 100.10%. 
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Araba Gertu S.A. 5.00 
Euskal Irrati Telebista 5.00 
Caja de Ahorros de Vitoria y Álava 2.70 
Ente Vasco de la Energía 2.00 
Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa Inversiones 2.00 
Unknown 0.76 
Telefónica de España S.A. Telefónica S.A. 100.00 
 
Source: author’s own research based on SABI data. 
 
The control structure of Sogecable S.A. has been commented on earlier when referring to FTA television, 
but it is worth pointing out a couple of issues when describing the Digital+ platform. Firstly, the presence 
of Vivendi, who brought to Sogecable its experience with a French digital satellite platform, Canal Satellite 
Numérique –currently known as CanalSat–. Secondly, the role of the telecommunications operator 
Telefónica, the second-largest shareholder in the company and, at the same time, a competitor with its 
IPTV service Imagenio. 
 
Final control over the operator Ono was in the hands of Grupo Corporativo Ono S.A., a holding company 
made up of several minority shareholders who had reached a pact in order to manage it. The leading 
group amongst these shareholders was Multitel (21%), a company controlled by Eugenio Galdón, the 
president of the company. With the exception of Sodinteleco (4.30%), the rest of the owners came from 
the financial sector: Providence Equity Partners Inc., Thomas H. Lee Partners L.P., JP Morgan through 
CCMP Inc. LLC (15.20% each), Quadrangle Capital Partners (9.10%), GE Structured Finance Inc. (8.90%), 
Caisse de Dépôt et Placement from Québec (6.70%) and the Grupo Santander (4.50%), the only Spanish 
financial representative. 
Telecable de Asturias S.A. was wholly controlled by the Sociedad Promotora de las Telecomunicaciones en 
Asturias, a company that shared the same address with (and whose shareholdings were divided equally 
between) Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico and Caja de Ahorros de Asturias (Cajastur), with some 45.95%.15 
The third largest shareholder was Editorial Prensa Asturiana, the publisher of the regional newspaper La 
Nueva España, with 8.1%. In short, three companies with strong local roots: although control in two of 
those cases was in the hands of groups outside the region of Asturias: Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico under 
                                                           
15 Halfway through 2006 it was announced that Cajastur would take effective control of the company through purchasing the shareholdings of Hidroeléctrica 
del Cantábrico, although according to the Mercantile Register, this change (which included 0.10% of the percentage of Editorial Prensa Asturiana), did not 
actually take place until January 2007: “Cajastur se hace con el 92% de Telecable tras llegar un acuerdo para adquirir la participación de HC”, El Economista, 
27th July 2006 [http://www.eleconomista.es/mercados-cotizaciones/noticias/49018/08/07/Economia-Finanzas-Cajastur-se-hace-con-el-92-de-Telecable-tras-
llegar-un-acuerdo-para-adquirir-la-participacion-de-HC.html] (consulted 13th August 2007). 
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the umbrella of Energías de Portugal (EDP) and Editorial Prensa Asturiana integrated within Editorial 
Prensa Ibérica. 
R Cable y Telecomunicaciones Galicia S.A. was in charge of the development of the cable service in this 
region, with the exception of the Coruña area, where service was provided by a 91% subsidiary of the 
company, R Cable y Telecomunicaciones Coruña S.A. The remaining 9% of the company was in the hands 
of Empresa Municipal de Aguas de La Coruña, a local water company.16 As far as R Cable y 
Telecomunicaciones Galicia S.A. is concerned, its two main shareholders were the energy company Unión 
Fenosa (35.93%) and the savings bank Caixa de Aforros from Vigo, Ourense and Pontevedra (31.39%), 
operating under the name Caixa Nova. Other minority shareholders with roots in the region included: 
Banco Pastor (10.04%) the newspaper Faro de Vigo (also controlled by Editorial Prensa Ibérica, 2.10%), 
as well as Cable Total (9.85%), a company wholly owned by Dalbergia, the investment tool of Antonio 
Asensio Mosbah, the head of the Zeta Group. 
Euskaltel S.A. was the company handling the commercialisation of the cable service in the Basque 
Country. The shareholding was controlled by companies in the region and especially by financial groups 
from the Basque Country: Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa (33.13%), CK Corporación Kutxa-Kutxa Korporazioa 
(22.98%), a company controlled by the Caja Guipúzcoa San Sebastián, and the savings bank Caja de 
Ahorros de Vitoria y Álava (Caja Vital), both directly (2.70%) and through Araba Gertu (5%). Other 
shareholders with their headquarters in the region included the energy company Iberdrola (11.14%), the 
regional public service broadcaster Euskal Irrati Telebista (5%), the Ente Vasco de la Energía (2%) and 
Corporativa Mondragón (2%). The picture was completed by another multinational energy company, 
Endesa (10%). 
The IPTV service Imagenio was being offered by Telefónica de España S.A., a subsidiary wholly owned by 
the parent company Telefónica S.A. The largest telecommunications firm in Spain was quoted on the stock 
exchange but had very few significant shareholders. Among those which had more than 1% of shares and 
which came from the financial sector, those worth noting were: Chase Nominees Limited (9.90%), State 
Street Bank and Trust Company (7.60%), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (6.96%), Caixa d’Estalvis i 
Pensions de Barcelona (5.06%), The Capital Group Companies Inc. (3.40%), Barclays Bank PLC (3.10%), 
Fidelity International Limited (1.01%) and American Europacific (1%). 
In terms of the origins of the stockholders,17 it can be observed that the degree of presence of 
international capital in the main operators of Spanish pay-TV was very variable, representing an average 
                                                           
16 From the 1st June 2008, R Cable y Telecomunicaciones Coruña S.A. became part of R Cable y Telecomunicaciones Galicia S.A. 
17 In order to analyse data relating to Telecable and Telefónica we have used data referring to the secondary level shareholders Sociedad Promotora de las 
Telecomunicaciones en Asturias S.A. and those of Telefónica S.A. 
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of 26.22%, against 60.28% of Spanish capital and some 13.50% whose origin it was not possible to 
determine (Figure 4). Only in the case of Ono do we clearly observe a majority interest from international 
capital –basically American– of more than 70%. Telecable altered this percentage to little more than half, 
thanks to the control of Hidrocantábrico by the main Portuguese electric company. Telefónica came close 
to this average, although it proved impossible to determine the origin of more than 60% of its shares, 
scattered, as they are throughout the stock exchange and very internationalised, probably representing 
more than 50%. The other operators were owned by majority Spanish capital, especially in the case of R 
Cable and Euskatel. 
 
 
Figure 4. Origin of shareholders in pay-TV operators (12/2006) 
Source: author’s own research. 
 
Of the quarter of the foreign shareholders identified, the majority came from the United States, 
representing almost half the shares in foreign hands (Figure 5) thanks to investments by Goldman Sachs 
Group, Inc., CCMP Capital LLC, Providence Equity Partners Inc, Thomas H. Lee Partners L.P., Quadrangle 
Capital Partners, GE Structured Finance Inc., State Street Bank and Trust Company, The Capital Group 
Companies Inc. and American Europacific. The next in the list was Portugal with almost 30%, attributable 
totally to investment by EDP in Telecable, while the rest of the percentages shared out between the 
United Kingdom (11.73% through EC Nominees Limited, Chase Nominees Limited and Barclays Bank PLC), 
Canada (4.26% through the participation of Quebec’s Caisse de Dépôt et Placement in Ono), France 
(3.49%, through the participation of Vivendi in Sogecable), Switzerland (1.49%, through Financière Syz & 
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Co.) and the Bermuda (0.64%, through Fidelity International Limited). Together the countries of the 
European Union made up 44.42% of the total, still less than the United States. 
 
 
Figure 5. Origin of international shareholders in pay-TV platforms (12/2006) 
Source: author’s own research. 
 
 
4.4. Production for pay-TV 
 
As for the production of thematic channels for pay-TV, the presence of some globally important TNMCs 
was detected. 
Liberty Media was present in the Spanish market in multiple ways. Firstly through Multicanal Iberia, a 
wholly-owned subsidiary that produced its own four channels (Canal Hollywood, Extreme Sports, Odisea, 
Sol Música) as well as another two in association with A&E Television Networks (Canal de Historia and The 
Biography Channel). In addition, through its Latin American subsidiary Pramer, it sold another channel to 
Ono, TV Chile. Finally, Liberty18 appeared to be the company in charge of Discovery Communications Inc., 
owner of Discovery Communications Spain and Portugal, which produced, for the Spanish market, the 
channels People+Arts, the Discovery Channel and the three offshoots of this latter channel: Science, 
                                                           
18 Liberty ceased to be the formal owner of Discovery thanks to a spin-off of the latter in July 2005, since when they become independent companies with the 
same shareholders [http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=61138&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=733391&highlight=] (consulted 30th September 2008). This 
has not stopped John Malone continuing to be the overall boss of both companies; the fabric of control of which is extremely obscure and gets lost in 
multiple companies. 
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Civilization and Turbo. 
Disney’s interests were represented directly by The Walt Disney Company Iberia, which was in charge of 
developing all the activities of the holding in Spain, from cinema distribution to independent production for 
FTA television or the production of its four thematic channels: Disney Channel, Disney Channel +1, Toon 
Disney and Playhouse Disney. The world of children’s television was also the target of another indirect 
presence in Spain, the Jetix channel, represented by Jetix España, a company with a 50% stake through 
Jetix Europe Ltd., whose headquarters were in the United Kingdom. The Spanish partner in the project 
was Sogecable. Ono also offered ESPN Classic, one of ABC Inc.’s channels, a subsidiary in which Disney 
had an 80% stake. 
The American conglomerate Time-Warner, through its subsidiary Turner Broadcasting System Spain, 
offered several thematic channels (Boomerang, Cartoon Network, TCM, their respective +1 versions and 
the international signal of CNN). It also controlled, together with Sogecable, the Compañía Independiente 
de Noticias de Televisión behind the news channel CNN+. 
The American Hearst Corporation had a presence in Spain through Canal Cosmopolitan Iberia, the 
company that ran Cosmo TV. It also held, in addition, 20% of ABC Inc., the supply company for Ono. 
Other American based firms included Viacom, which operated thematic channels in Spain through its two 
subsidiaries, Paramount Comedy Channel Spain and MTV Channel Spain. The former producing the 
homonymous channel, while the latter specialised in music channels (MTV, VH1, etc.) and the children’s 
channel Nick/Nickelodeon. 
General Electric, one of the largest industrial conglomerates in the world, also had interests in the 
production of thematic channels in Spain. Viewers could see three of its channels: CNBC Europe (offering 
generic content in English aimed at the European continent) and two more created by its Spanish 
subsidiary NBC Universal Global Networks Spain, Calle 13 and the Sci-Fi channel. 
In Spain, News Corp. had a subsidiary Fox International Channels Spain, which distributed the news 
channel in English Fox News and the preschool channel Baby TV as well as producing material for Fox’s 
fiction channel and the documentary channel National Geographic. This latter was the fruit of an 
agreement with NGC Network International LLC. 
The Japanese group Sony had expressed great interest, for some decades, in various sectors of the 
cultural industries. In Spain, it operated through SPTI Networks Iberia, which produced the AXN channel. 
Bouygues, the French group owning French channel TF1, had a presence in Spain through Eurosport 
Television S.A., which managed the specialist sports channels Eurosport and Eurosport 2. 
Lagardère, the group belonging to the French entrepreneur Arnaud Lagardère, was present in the Spanish 
market through the French owned Mezzo S.A., the company behind the classical music channel Mezzo. 
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The company owned 60% of the channel, while the rest of the capital was shared equally between France 
Télémusique and the publicly owned France Télévisions. 
Bloomberg, the group belonging to the American magnate Michael Bloomberg, had its presence in the 
Spanish market through the homonymous channel, specialising in the economy. 
The Mexican Televisa group offered products from its Televisa Estudios factory such as the soap channel 
Telenovelas, Canal de las Estrellas, De Película or Ritmosón. 
Cisneros, the largest Venezuelan communications group, had a presence in Spain through three 
companies. Directly with its Venevisión channel; indirectly through the Argentinean company Playboy TV 
Latin America & Iberia LLC, which operated the Playboy TV channel in Spain, Portugal and Latin America; 
and through another Argentinean company, Claxson, which produced the music channel HTV. 
To this group, we had to add public service broadcasters from different countries that form part of some 
of the platforms, such as the UK’s BBC, the Portuguese RTP, the German Deutsche Welle, the Moroccan 
RTM or the ever-increasing number of Latin American and Eastern European channels. 
In Figure 6, we show the origins of the providers of thematic channels for each of the six main Spanish 
pay-TV platforms. It can be observed that these platforms largely derive from companies with 
headquarters in Spain (the presence of foreign producers oscillating between 4% in Telecable to 25.49% 
in Ono). The average figure being 14.45% of the total, which, when we eliminate duplication among 
platforms, increases to 20.26%. 
 
 
Figure 6. Site of the headquarters of producers of thematic channels (12/2006) 
Source: author’s own research. 
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The application of SNA to the commercial relationships that the producers of thematic television had 
established with pay television platforms allows us to go deeper into the subject of internationalisation 
through the sales of thematic channels and their distribution by the platforms analysed (Figure 7). Three 
large groups of protagonists can be observed: Spanish capital (yellow), Spanish subsidiaries of large 
TNMC’s (red) and foreign companies offering their stations on some other platforms (green). These latter 
were linked, above all, with Ono, the first pay-TV system to opt for content aimed specifically at the 
immigrant community. At the core of these relationships, those belonging to the first two groups were 
particularly noticeable. In addition, there were two companies with headquarters in Spain, but whose 
capital was shared 50% by Spanish and foreign companies (orange), as well as another where the origin 
of their capital is unknown (grey). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Site of the headquarters of producers of thematic channels (12/2006) 
Source: author’s own research. 
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5. Internationalisation typologies and strategies 
 
In previous analyses of the different Spanish television markets certain names have continually cropped 
up, firms that were present in several of these markets through different types of control strategies, either 
directly or through subsidiaries or shareholdings. Table 5 shows a cross-section of the main groups 
identified; linked to the markets analysed. 
 
Table 5. Cross-section of the communication groups involved in Spanish TV (2006) 
Group Country FTA TV Operator 
FTA TV 
producer Pay-TV Operator Pay-TV producer 
4K Holding Argentina  
Spanish 
subsidiary   
Bertelsmann Germany Minority shareholding, no management 
Spanish 
subsidiary   
Bloomberg USA    Foreign subsidiary 
Bouygues France    Spanish subsidiary 
Cisneros Venezuela    Foreign subsidiary 
De Agostini Italy 
Control and management 
in alliance    
General 
Electric USA   
Minority 
shareholding Spanish subsidiary 
Hearst USA    Spanish subsidiary 
Lagardère France    Spanish subsidiary 
Liberty Media USA    
Spanish subsidiary + 
foreign subsidiary 
Mediaset Italy 
Spanish subsidiary 
(majority control and 
management) 
Spanish 
subsidiary   
News Corp. USA    Spanish subsidiary 
RCS 
MediaGroup Italy 
Majority control and 
management 
Spanish 
subsidiary   
Sony Japan  Spanish subsidiary  Spanish subsidiary 
Televisa Mexico Minority shareholding, no management   Foreign subsidiary 
Time Warner USA    Spanish subsidiary 
Viacom USA    Spanish subsidiary 
Vivendi France Minority shareholding, no management  
Minority 
shareholding, no 
management 
Minority 
shareholding, no 
management 
Walt Disney USA  
Spanish 
subsidiary  Spanish subsidiary 
 
Source: author’s own research. 
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The majority of the groups identified were focused on a single operating area. Only in a few cases did 
they act in two of the markets defined, although always in relationship, whether vertically integrated 
(between production and broadcasting, like Bertelsmann, Mediaset and RCS MediaGroup in FTA TV and, in 
the pay-TV field through a financial subsidiary of the parent company, General Electric) or in markets with 
the same production expertise (Sony and Walt Disney), apart from the particular case of Televisa, with 
interests in FTA television and in production for pay-TV. So, from the position of the different groups, it is 
possible to characterise the international presence in Spanish television in relation to the different markets 
as: 
 
• Strong in FTA TV, especially the case of the Italian groups, which control the TV station with the 
maximum audience (Mediaset with Telecinco), co-manage the second most popular private 
television station in the country (De Agostini with Antena 3) and also control one of the new 
operators (RCS MediaGroup with Veo Televisión). 
• Peripheral although just beginning in independent FTA production, a field whose growth has 
started to whet the appetite of large groups such as Disney, Bertelsmann, Sony, Mediaset or RCS 
MediaGroup, which rub shoulders with groups that started off in production like Endemol or 
Banijay. 
• Important in pay-TV platforms, although here the main characteristic that define them is the 
financial character of their investment, with the merely symbolic presence, in practice, of TNMC’s. 
• Exclusive in the production for pay-TV, where competition among large-scale international groups 
and their huge portfolios weigh heavily against groups with Spanish capital, which only obtained 
an important position through vertical integration, as demonstrated by Sogecable. 
 
In order to establish their positions in the Spanish market, the different groups identified have had to opt 
between a direct or indirect presence. Among those which have opted for the first option, strategies that 
are varied and complimentary can be found: 
 
• Organic growth is the option taken by companies that have decided to install a subsidiary in the 
country choosing to grow through its organic activity, like for example Walt Disney, Hearst, Sony, 
Liberty, Bouygues and News Corp. 
• Many cases have been found of companies choosing external growth through acquisitions. As an 
example, take the thematic channel People & Arts, produced by Discovery, a subsidiary of Liberty 
Media. It was created from Canal Estilo, originally owned by Sogecable through the company 
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Canal Estilo S.L., acquired in 2003 by Discovery Spanish Ventures S.L., the parent company of 
Discovery Communications Spain and Portugal S.L.19 More recently, the acquisition of the 
Recoletos group by a subsidiary of the RCS MediaGroup, Unidad Editorial, provided an example 
that united other media activities to the television based environment, although we could also 
have alluded to the participation of Recoletos in Veo Televisión. 
• Alliances among competitors can also be detected, which include a double variety: alliances with 
local operators and alliances between international groups. In the first case, this is usually based 
on the local company’s knowledge of the local market. Some of the cases we detected involved 
the participation and joint control exercised by the Spanish group Planeta with the Italian De 
Agostini in Antena 3; the similar operation, although without management participation, of 
Televisa in laSexta; the alliance maintained by Mediaset with Vocento over shareholdings in 
Telecinco; or the joint companies that work with Sogecable in producing thematic channels like 
Disney (Jetix España, which created the children’s channel of the same name) and Time-Warner 
(the Compañía Independiente de Noticias de Televisión behind CNN+). In the alliances between 
international operators, complimentary contents are sought: Liberty Media created the Canal de 
Historia and The Biography Channel through an agreement with A&E Television Networks, the 
same type of agreement that News Corp. had with NGC Network International LLC for another 
thematic channel package, National Geographic. On another level, the shareholding, Lagardère 
had been in association with France Télévisions to create Mezzo. 
 
Direct operation in the Spanish market has not always been successful, as demonstrated by the brief 
experience of the Mexican Televisa group, which between 1996 and 2001 ran a Spanish subsidiary, Grupo 
Televisa España. Now, this group has opted for the sale of its content from the headquarters of its 
subsidiary Televisa Estudios in Miami, in addition to its investment in laSexta. The Venezuelan group 
Cisneros also employs this indirect presence strategy when selling its thematic channels through its 
Argentinean subsidiaries Playboy TV Latin America & Iberia LLC (Playboy TV) and Claxson (HTV). Despite 
the fact that, since 1992, it has been involved in the company Venevisión International Europe, based in 
Spain. Although it has a branch of its studios in Madrid, Bloomberg has not opted for a Spanish subsidiary, 
but rather act through Bloomberg LP. 
This direct and indirect presence appears to be related to the distinction proposed by Theodore Levitt 
(1983) between multinational corporations and global corporations. According to his proposal, the former 
                                                           
19 http://www.sogecable.es/media/pdfs/2003/relevantes/estilo.pdf (consulted 3rd August 2007). 
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operate in different countries adjusting their practices and their products to each of them, at a relatively 
high cost, which demands, in this case, the opening of subsidiary companies. The latter, on the other 
hand, sell the same products in all markets and, additionally, do it in the same way, meaning that they 
only need a sales structure for this product. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Looking at the results of the analysis would seem to confirm that internationalisation is indeed a growing 
trend in the Spanish television market. This is not necessarily harmful in itself, but it is highly significant of 
the incapacity of the Spanish industry to develop solid projects and to achieve key positions even acting in 
its own territory. The results, however, offer several significant details with relation to each of the 
segments analysed. 
In the case of FTA TV, of the three original licensees for nationwide private television, only PRISA through 
Sogecable has been able to consolidate an entirely Spanish project within the highly competitive FTA TV 
field. This success will have to be analysed, in future researches, in relation to the development of its new 
FTA offer, Cuatro. The model in question is that which Vocento and Mediapro have been following with 
Net TV and laSexta, and represents their bid to unseat PRISA from the top of the league in Spanish media 
groups. 
Among the other contenders, there is a high degree of internationalisation, or should we say of 
Italianization, since it is the Italian groups Mediaset, RCS MediaGroup and De Agostini, in association with 
the Spanish group Planeta, which have control of the main operators. 
Foreign presence is much reduced in the field of independent production, a more youthful area that is still 
in the process of consolidation and which has not aroused as much interest among the TNMC’s, which 
have largely made inroads in two ways. Firstly, through the vertical expansion of their Spanish 
subsidiaries, as is well reflected in the vertical integration strategy a l’amont of Mediaset or RCS 
MediaGroup. Secondly, through the internationalisation of the activities of foreign production groups trying 
to get a European dimension that makes it necessary for them to entry into a relatively large and growing 
market like the Spanish one, a strategy followed by Endemol and FremantleMedia. Our SNA has 
demonstrated that this presence is becoming qualitatively important, occupying central positions in the 
system as a whole. 
The picture is quite different with respect to FTA TV. In multi-channel television, foreign presence is 
concentrating on the production of content, more than distribution. Among the main international 
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protagonists, there is only one group of U.S. financial companies controlling one operator, Ono. 
Accordingly, in the field of thematic channel production, we find the presence of some 20% of foreign 
produced content. Nevertheless, a large proportion of the thematic channels being produced in Spain was 
controlled by TNMC’s; a position derived from the strength of their content portfolio and which is surely 
followed up in the field of audiovisual rights for fiction and documentaries. As the SNA has revealed, their 
central position is beyond question. Here, US dominion is apparent (Bloomberg, Disney, General Electric, 
Hearst, Liberty Media, News Corp., Time-Warner and Viacom), with very little space left in the market for 
other groups of different nationalities (the Mexican Televisva, the French Bouygues and Lagardère, the 
Venezuelan Cisneros and the Japanese Sony representing the few exceptions). The US companies are 
simply extending into this television area the strategies developed in the cinematographic market for many 
decades. Only one national supplier, Sogecable, was in a relatively strong position – in fact it was the 
leader in production of thematic channels–, but its position is unquestionably related to its vertical 
integration in the Digital+ platform and the protection that this would confer on it. 
European groups had a growing presence, but with trajectories that diverged from that of the US groups, 
concentrating on the production of thematic channels. Of particular note, in this respect, are the positions 
in FTA television of Mediaset (through Telecinco) and De Agostini (in association with Planeta in Antena 
3), as well as the German Bertelsmann, main shareholder of RTL, stockholder of Antena 3 and also 
present in independent production through its subsidiary FremantleMedia. In this field, it is the European 
firms which are once more in control. The Italian Mediaset (through Telecinco’s subsidiary Salta 
Producciones) and RCS MediaGroup (operating through an audiovisual subsidiary of Unidad Editorial, El 
Mundo TV) or the Dutch Endemol group. In multi-channel television, we could also include the French 
Vivendi due to its participation in Sogecable. However, its role here was not very extensive and did not 
include management responsibilities. 
The results, in relationship to the origin of the groups concerned, coincide with the theories of Herbert I. 
Schiller (1992) who stated that it is not appropriate to talk about American cultural imperialism, but rather 
of transnational corporate cultural domination with a strong American accent. In this case, despite the 
manifest dominant position of groups originating in Spain, equally important positions have been observed 
among European, Asiatic and Latin American groups. Their position is even dominant in areas such as FTA 
TV, guaranteeing wider social repercussions of the activities carried out by these companies. 
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